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NEUROSCIENCE, MINDREADING,
AND THE COURTS:
THE EXAMPLE OF PAIN
HENRY T. GREELY*
Our brains hold about 100 billion neurons.1 At the synapses where
neurons connect, the neurons are constantly giving off and picking up
chemicals called neurotransmitters, which in turn can cause those neurons
to “fire”—to run cascading ions down the neurons’ “wires” or axons.2 And
that process creates the Universe we live in.3
Not quite, literally. I do believe, though I cannot rigorously prove, that
you exist, the Earth exists, and the Universe exists outside of our own
brains, but our only interaction with that reality is through our brains and
the physical events that happen there. Those objective physical events
create a subjective and non-physical “thing” we call the mind. If you
remember tomorrow that you read this Article (or this much of the Article),
it is because this Article (and I) will have made physical changes to your
brain.
As we get better at looking at those physical changes in the brain
through various new technologies, we can begin to correlate those objective
physical brain states with subjective mental states.4 We can begin to say
Copyright © 2015 by Henry Greely.
* Henry Greely is the Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law and Professor, by
courtesy, of Genetics at Stanford University, where he directs the Center for Law and the
Biosciences, and the Stanford Program in Neuroscience and Society. This Article is adapted from
the author's Stuart Rome Lecture, delivered at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law
on April 24, 2014.
1. Suzana Herculano-Houzel, The Human Brain in Numbers: A Linearly Scaled-Up Primate
Brain,
FRONTIERS
HUMAN
NEUROSCIENCE
(Nov.
9,
2009),
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009/full.
2. See HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 935 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining
the process by which a neurotransmitter, which originates at the presynaptic neuron, sends a signal
when it is sent to the postsynaptic target cell).
3. See Robert Lanza, A New Theory of the Universe: Biocentrism Builds on Quantum
Physics by Putting Life Into the Equation, AM. SCHOLAR (Mar. 1, 2007),
https://theamericanscholar.org/a-new-theory-of-the-universe/#.VRIZjjTF-Hw.
4. See B. ALAN WALLACE, MIND IN THE BALANCE: MEDITATION IN SCIENCE, BUDDHISM,
AND CHRISTIANITY 23 (2009) (noting the difference between objectively studying the brain and
understanding the subjective mental state that is occurring simultaneously).
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“any time you move the big toe on your left foot, these neurons fire,” or
“every time you see a face, those neurons fire.”5
Consider, for example, some spectacular work by Professor Jack
Gallant at the University of California at Berkeley.6 Gallant’s group showed
thousands of hours of YouTube videos to some volunteers while they were
in a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scanner.7 The MRI noted the
changes at different times in the relative amounts of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin in different parts of the volunteers’ brains, in a
process called functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”).8
Computers analyzed the resulting data and found correlations between what
the volunteers were seeing at any given time and the patterns of these
hemodynamic changes.9 Gallant then took different volunteers, put them in
the MRI scanner, and showed them trailers from movies.10 His team took
the resulting brain scans and, using the correlations from the original work,
“re-created” the scenes from the trailers as the volunteers saw them.11 The
results are far from perfect—but still close to amazing. When, in a trailer,
an elephant walks across a plain from left to right, the recreation of what the
viewer sees from the viewer’s brain scan shows something that looks like
an elephant-shaped haystack walking from left to right across a plain.12 The
results come from correlating perceived physical states of the brain with

5. See Ferris Jabr, Know Your Neurons: How to Classify Different Types of Neurons in the
Brain’s
Forest,
SCI.
A M.
(May
16,
2012),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/brainwaves/2012/05/16/know-your-neurons-classifying-themany-types-of-cells-in-the-neuron-forest/ (noting that neurons are classified by function because
neurons that carry sensory information are not the same neurons that carry signals for motor
function in the body).
6. See Yasmin Anwar, Scientists Use Brain Imaging to Reveal the Movies in Our Mind, UC
BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brainmovies (citing the cutting-edge work by Prof. Jack Gallant and his lab, which have successfully
reconstructed humans’ visual experiences through computer simulation as the participants
watched Hollywood movie trailers); see also Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual
Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies, GALLANT LAB @ UC BERKELEY
http://gallantlab.org/publications/nishimoto-et-al-2011.html (last updated June 18, 2014)
(explaining the use of an fMRI machine to measure brain activity during the experiment, and the
computational models used to reconstruct what participants saw).
7. Anwar, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Malcolm Ritter, Mind-Reading Technology Reconstructs Videos from Brain, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/mindreadingtechnology-reconstructs-videos-from-brain-20110923-1ko5s.html (noting that human forms were
more recognizable in reconstructions, while figures such as elephants did not transition so clearly).
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subjective mental states.13 It comes from, in some small way, reading
minds.
This Article is about mindreading and its applications to the law. We
are beginning to be able to use neuroimaging and other techniques to read
minds.14 Most of the attention in the burgeoning field of law and
neuroscience has focused on issues of free will and criminal responsibility,
but the most important contribution that neuroscience will make to the law
will be through neuroscience-based mindreading. And I suspect its first
important use will be in the area of detecting “pain,” on which this Article
will focus.15
This Article makes that argument in four parts. First, it looks at what
kind of evidence the law currently uses to read minds, and how
neuroscience-based evidence would and would not be different.16 Second, it
discusses some of the possible ways the law could use neuroscience-based
mindreading.17 Third, in its most novel contribution, it analyzes what kind
of proof the law should demand of the accuracy of such mindreading
techniques—and what we would have to invest in developing these
technologies to be confident in their use.18 Finally, it touches on one of the
deepest problems that might be raised by the use of accurate mindreading
evidence in the law.19
13. Anwar, supra note 6.
14. See Rob Hoskin, Can a Neuroscientist Read Your Mind?, SCIENCE BRAINWAVES (Apr.
30, 2012), http://www.sciencebrainwaves.com/uncategorized/can-a-neuroscientist-read-yourmind/ (highlighting the neural information that occurs even before a decision is made).
15. The implications for the legal system of neuroimaging of evidence of pain is the subject
of a small, but growing literature. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60
EMORY L.J. 585, 651 (2011) (identifying the need for more objective units to describe certain
experiences, like pain); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 453–54 (2007) (noting the need for more privacy for records regarding
pain); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How Neuroimaging Can
Transform the Law’s Approach to Pain, 66 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Amanda C.
Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of
Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 805 (2012) (highlighting that it is a major challenge to assign
values to brain imaging, just as it is a challenge to do the same for pain when attempting to create
law).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV. I have discussed some of these issues about mindreading twice before in
some depth. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience, Mindreading and the Law, in A PRIMER ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 120–49 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013);
Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of Neuroscience-Based
Mindreading in the Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara
Sahakian eds., 2011) (identifying the technical barriers to meaningful mindreading, including the
likely impossibility of creating a complete model of the human brain). I have also discussed them
in less detail in several other publications. See Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference
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We are near the edge of neuroscience-based mindreading in the law.
As two of my former Stanford post-docs said in an article, we currently see
“through a scanner darkly.”20 We don’t see clearly, but we see a little, and
the resolution of the scanner, or at least our understanding of what it means,
is getting better and better.21 As our resolution and understanding of the
scanners gets better, it will become more important in the law, in some
ways discussed here and in others still unforeseen.
I.

CURRENT EVIDENCE OF MENTAL STATES

Each one of us, in our day-to-day lives, reads minds constantly. So
does the legal system. This section discusses the evidence we currently use
for mindreading—in our everyday lives and in the law—with particular
reference to how we understand another’s pain. It then examines how these
current methods are similar to and different from neuroscience-based
evidence for mindreading.
A.

Mindreading In General

This Article started as a lecture.22 One tries to convey information in
both a lecture and in an article, but unlike an article, a lecture is more like a
conversation and full of mindreading. In any lecture, as with any other
direct human interaction, I read the minds of my audience. I look to see
Guide on Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 747–812 (National
Academies Press, 3d ed. 2011) (discussing examples of possible uses and limitations of
neuroscience in the courts); Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience:
Legal Problems; Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE AND POLICY 245–63 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (discussing different ways in which
neuroscience affects our society, such as better prediction of behavior, improved detection of
mental states, and enhancement of human brain functions); Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes,
Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377,
413 (2007) (arguing for federal regulation of fMRI-based lie detection); Henry T. Greely, Law
and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 707
(2009) (pointing out that the “revolution” in neuroscience allows for better understanding of
human brain processes and thus, better interventions in preserving or enhancing brain functions).
20. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1179–99
(2009) (discussing the reasons why functional brain imaging should not be admitted as evidence
of a defendant’s past mental state). Their title, of course, combines the title of the novel by the
amazing Philip K. Dark, A SCANNER DARKLY (1976), with language from St. Paul’s First Letter
to the Corinthians, “Now we see through a glass, darkly . . . .” I Corinthians 13:12 (King James).
21. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 20, at 1144 (describing how magnetic resonance
imaging scanners collect, process, and analyze functional imaging data).
22. Neuroimaging, Mindreading, and the Courts, The Stuart Rome Lecture, Imaging the
Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium (Apr. 24, 2014).
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who is awake, who is asleep, who is texting on their cell phone, who is
confused, who is angry. I try to do this primarily by looking at faces, though
also through examining some “body language,” which is usually pretty
limited when observing seated listeners.
In two-way verbal communications, either through face-to-face or by
video-call, we read other people’s minds in part through the content of what
they say, and also through their facial expressions and tone of voice.23 By
telephone, we still have tone of voice but lose the facial cues. In e-mail or
internet postings, we lose the tone of voice, which accounts for the popular
and important use of emoticons to provide more clues for mindreading—
was that a joke or not? (And, of course, the writer’s problem is the inability
to read the readers’ minds, caused by the lack of any feedback from the
readers.)
What we do in this day-to-day mindreading, of course, does not give
us any deep or necessarily accurate insight into what the other person is
truly thinking. We are looking at the outward appearance of that person
through their physical states—facial configurations, pitch, and accent of
words, and so on—and correlating that with mental states through our own
experiences.24 This experience can be with humanity in general, or with
that particular person—“she is always angry when her nose looks like
that.”25 We read minds through this correlation between objective physical
states and subjective mental states.26
This is likely an ancient and crucial human survival trait, encouraged
and preserved by evolution. It has been a long time since most humans have
had to worry more about lions and tigers and bears than about other
humans. The ability to guess whether the person coming toward you is
about to share food with you or attack you is and has long been a vital
survival skill.

23. See Jing Jiang et al., Neural Synchronization During Face-to-Face Communication, 32 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 16064, 16064 (2012) (stating that nonverbal cues such as orofacial movements,
facial expressions, and gestures are used to adapt our responses during communication).
24. See, e.g., Peter Carruthers, How We Know Our Minds: The Relationship Between
Mindreading and Metacognition, 32 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 121, 121–22 (2009) (claiming that
humans routinely and often unconsciously represent mental states using perceptions of others,
forming expectations accordingly).
25. See Rana el Kaliouby & Peter Robinson, Real-Time Inference of Complex Mental States
from Facial Expressions and Head Gestures, in REAL-TIME VISION FOR HUMAN-COMPUTER
INTERACTION 181 (Branislav Kisačanin et al. eds., 2005) (stating that the human face is an
essential and spontaneous means for communicating mental states).
26. Id. (explaining that facial expressions communicate feelings as well as cognitive mental
states).
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Some people lack that skill.27 One of the great disabilities for many
people with autism is that they do not develop what the psychologists call a
“theory of mind.”28 They do not have feeling for what other people are
thinking and often, as a result, have trouble getting along with others.29
Reading minds is very important.30 We learn it from an early age, we
use it every day, and we take it for granted. But what we are doing is taking
accessible evidence of external physical states and using it to infer
subjective mental states that are not directly accessible.31
We need no accessible evidence of external physical states to know if
we are in pain. We either feel pain or we do not. Someone else might
objectively conclude that, under the circumstances, we should not be
feeling the, say, phantom limb pain. Or that observer might be certain that
we should be in terrible pain from our own injuries in the car crash from
which we are desperately trying to remove a loved one. But our pain does
not need external indicia, at least to convince us. The pain is (or is not) our
direct perception, proximately created by the firing of some of the neurons
in our brain.
How do we decide whether other people are in pain? One way, of
course, is to ask them, “are you in pain?” In most circumstances, if
someone is not asleep, not unconscious, or not unable to understand or
speak a common language with you, asking them is a good start. But it is
not necessarily the end of the story—sometimes people do not tell the truth.
As Hamlet said, “one may smile, and smile, and be a villain.”32
The fact that people do not always tell the truth, or that sometimes they
exaggerate, is something that we learn, usually to our disadvantage, very
early in life. If people say they are in pain but we want further confirmation,
what else can we do? We can, and do, look for external circumstances that
27. Id. (remarking that majority of people attribute mental states to persons from observed
behaviors, and those who are not able to are at a disadvantage).
28. See Carruthers, supra note 24, at 136 (claiming that almost everyone believes that thirdperson mindreading is impaired in autism); Vivek Misra, The Social Brain Network and Autism,
21 ANNALS NEUROSCIENCE 69, 69 (2014) (discussing the “Theory of Mind” in autism, where
there is an inability to infer the state of mind of another person); see also el Kaliouby & Robinson,
supra note 25, at 181 (citing that people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders lack the ability
to read minds of others).
29. Rachel C. Leung et al., Early Neural Activation During Facial Affect Processing in
Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 7 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 203, 203 (2015),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2014.11.009 (stating that individuals with autism
experience difficulties with social cues and understanding of another person’s mental state, and
thus have impaired social functioning).
30. See el Kaliouby & Robinson, supra note 25, at 181 (stating that mindreading is
fundamental to social interaction, and it allows people to understand others’ actions).
31. Id.
32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, sc. 5, ln.108.

2015]

NEUROSCIENCE, MINDREADING, AND THE COURTS

177

correlate with pain. Some may be obvious causes of the pain while others
may be predictable consequences of it.
For example, imagine someone has just been in a car accident. The
jagged remnants of his femur are sticking out through the bloody wound in
his leg as he screams wildly, while hopping frantically down the street to
get away from the burning and possibly explosive car. That seems the kind
of circumstantial evidence that would lead many of us to conclude that he is
in pain. We see a wound that we would expect to cause great pain. We see
behavior like screaming, wincing, avoiding putting weight on the injured
leg that is consistent with a painful leg.
If, months later, you see that person again and he is limping, how do
you interrogate his pain? You can ask him. You can watch him walk.
Watching him limp could be consistent with him being in pain, but it could
also be consistent with a false limp, or it could be consistent with a limp
from a remaining structural flaw in his leg that is not painful. The limp is
one piece of external evidence about his pain, but you could also talk to his
friends. If one says “Pain? No, he never seemed to be in pain; he played
five sets of singles tennis yesterday,” that is some external evidence
consistent with an absence of pain, though even that is not conclusive. The
pain may be intense but intermittent, or pain may be eliminated by
occasional use of strong drugs or very strong incentives. We use this nondirect, circumstantial evidence to try to draw conclusions about somebody’s
mental state with regard to pain.33
We all use these methods to read minds. We just cannot use them
perfectly. After all, if we could read minds perfectly, poker would not exist,
dating would be quite different, and negotiations would be much shorter.
B.

The Law’s Current Efforts at Mindreading

The law tries to read minds all of the time. “Was this premeditated?”
“Was this done with malice aforethought?” “Was this reckless?” “Was this
knowing?” “Did you realize that the bonds you were trying to sell were

33. For any readers who are or have been a parent of a small child, another example may be
the way you determined whether your toddler was really in pain or was just seeking to manipulate
other people, such as convincing you to discipline his or her sibling. The sounds, the apparent
cause of the pain, the child’s reaction to your reaction—all of these can help you assess just how
real that pain was. See Lesley Budell et al., Mirroring Pain in the Brain: Emotional Expression
Versus
Motor
Imitation,
PLOS
ONE
(Feb.
11,
2015),
www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0107526&represe
ntation=PDF (stating that perception of pain experienced by another person has many channels
through which the emotion and sensorium of another is communicated).
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fraudulent?” All of these are questions about people’s internal and
subjective mental states.
Sometimes these are questions that the finders of fact can only assess
by looking witnesses in the eye and trying to decide whether to believe
them or not. But often, the law has other evidence that it believes correlates
with relevant mental states. These may be recorded or remembered words
that parties or witnesses said or wrote. Or it might be various actions that
they took, like buying one-way tickets to Brazil the day before they got
arrested. Or it could be various past events in their lives that may help
establish motives or capabilities. All of these are external and objective
pieces of evidence that the law uses to probe for witnesses’ internal and
subjective mental state.
Pain is one of the subjective mental states that the law most often
needs to determine. Hundreds of thousands of legal proceedings each year
in the United States turn on the existence and extent of someone’s (usually
a plaintiff’s or claimant’s) pain.34 Sometimes those are personal injury
cases, in which plaintiffs seek damages for their “pain and suffering” for the
past, present, and predictably future in the aftermath of accidents.35 Most of
them are actually disability cases, brought under federal or state disability
schemes, or against private disability insurers.36 Although the technical
question in those cases is not pain per se, it is quite often a question as to
whether the claimants’ pains are so great as to prevent them from
working.37
The law will, when it can, ask the plaintiff or claimant whether or not
he or she is in pain, but, with often substantial money at stake, the other
side (the defendant, the disability program, or insurer) is not going to be

34. Pustilnik, supra note 15, at 802 (stating that pain is omnipresent in the law, and the
presence and degree of physical pain are defined by various legal domains).
35. See Jack H. Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury
Litigation, 11 DUKE L.J. 344, 344 (1962) (stating how past, present, and future pain and suffering
are well recognized elements of damages in personal injury actions).
36. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Cases, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=45 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (stating that a large
number of personal injury claims stem from medical malpractice and automobile accidents, and
are brought in state or federal courts); see also THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY IN AMERICA 33, 437
(Marilyn J. Field & Alan M. Jette eds., 2007) (listing the different laws and avenues where people
can bring disability suits).
37. Under Social Security Disability Insurance, the first question is whether you can resume
the work you did before you became disabled. If the answer is “no,” the next question is whether
you can adjust to doing other work. See SOCIAL SECURITY, DISABILITY BENEFITS 9–10 (2014),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf (stating that the Social Security
Administration asks several questions about a potential receiver’s ability to work and how it is
affected).
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satisfied with only self-report.38 Neither will the legal system.39 Instead, the
legal system will look for some external evidence to corroborate the claim
of pain.40 Just as we do in our day-to-day lives, the law will look for
evidence about a plausible cause for the pain, as well as evidence from
others about whether the plaintiff’s or claimant’s behavior has been
consistent with that claimed pain.41
Sometimes, though, the law will also seek expert testimony.42 A
physician may be called to discuss the results of various kinds of imaging.43
She may testify that the MRI of the person’s back shows bulging
intervertebral disks, which is consistent with the chronic lower back pain
the person reports. Or the physician may state that her patient’s PET scan
shows that the patient’s tumor has metastasized to the bones, and that
severe pain is quite common in this circumstance. Or the expert testimony
may not involve imaging at all. An expert witness might be called to testify
how common it is for people who, for example, have had a hand amputated
to feel continuing pain years after the amputation.44
For better or for worse, physicians are limited to providing evidence of
objective, externally accessible facts (the bulging disks or the bone
metastases) and their correlation (positive, negative, or neither) with the
claimed pain.45 They have no “pain meter” and no device that can directly
38. See id. at 7–8 (stating that in order to find benefits under social security, the applicant
must provide all information and proof of disability, including substantial evidence such as
medical records, names and dosages of medicine, and laboratory test results to support a potential
applicant’s claim).
39. Olender, supra note 35, at 367 (stating that it is advantageous to have medical experts
support a plaintiff’s claim).
40. Id.
41. See id. (stating that expert testimony is admissible and essential to recovery for damages
where facts may not infer pain and suffering).
42. Id.
43. See AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, QUALIFICATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE EXPERT
WITNESS
(June
25,
2005),
available
at
https://www.aan.com/uploadedFiles/Website_Library_Assets/Documents/8.Membership/5.Ethics/
1.Code_of_Conduct/Membership-EthicsAmerican%20Academy%20of%20Neurology%20Qualifications%20and%20Guidelines%20for%
20the%20Physician%20Expert%20Witness%20%282%29.pdf (stating the elements of medical
expert testimony for neurologists, including discussing imaging).
44. See Olender, supra note 35, at 359–60, 367 (explaining the concept behind “phantom
pain,” where amputees feel pain where the amputated part used to be, and that it may be explained
through expert testimony in order to be compensated in personal injury actions); Vilayanar S.
Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran, Phantom Limbs and Neural Plasticity, 57
NEUROLOGICAL REV. 317, 317 (2000) (explaining the phenomenon of a “phantom limb,” where
people may still feel pain despite amputation),
45. See Olender, supra note 35, at 366 (stating that most clinical work is not germane to
proving the pain in an individual, and that physicians are limited in accurately measuring pain);
see also Tonya Eippert, A Proposal to Recognize a Legal Obligation on Physicians to Provide
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measure a person’s level of pain. And that is often perceived as the promise,
in the context of pain, of neuroimaging: that it might provide evidence, not
of conditions that correlate with pain, but of pain itself. But that is wrong.

C.

Neuroimaging Compared with Current Methods of Mindreading

How would the potential use of neuroimaging for mindreading
compare to our more accustomed methods of mindreading? Very closely.
Neuroimaging, at least as it currently seems plausible, cannot provide
direct evidence of the subjective mental state itself.46 Instead, in its most
discussed form (fMRI), neuroimaging provides direct evidence of the ratio
of oxygenated to de-oxygenated hemoglobin in small cubic volumes of the
brain (known as voxels), and of the changes in those ratios over time.47
Those changes are then used to infer activity in particular brain structures,
in a particular order, and, perhaps, in relative intensities.48 Those activation
patterns are then correlated with activation patterns of many people’s brains
when they reported (honestly, it is believed) their own subjective mental
states of experiencing pain, of knowingly telling a lie, of feeling a particular
emotion, or of recognizing an image as something they had seen before.49
As an example in the case of pain, the researchers will inflict upon the
subjects some acute (but not damaging) pain.50 Parts of their arms may
have been smeared with capsaicin, the most active ingredient in chili

Adequate Medication to Alleviate Pain, 12 J.L & HEALTH 384–85 (1998) (stating the Texas
Second District Court of Appeal’s examples of objective evidence of injury that would support an
award for pain and suffering, including skull and facial fractures and other various injuries).
46. See Russell A. Poldrack, Inferring Mental States from Neuroimaging Data: From Reverse
Inference to Large-Scale Decoding, 72 NEURON PERSPECTIVE 692, 695 (2011) (stating that
decoding methods cannot overcome neuroimaging’s inherently correlational nature).
47. See Tor D. Wager et al., Elements of Functional Neuroimaging, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 19, 21 (John T. Cacioppo et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (stating that fMRI uses the
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (“BOLD”) method to measure the ratio of oxygenated to
deoxygenated hemoglobin in the blood across regions of the brain).
48. Id. at 34 (stating that the inferential context for neuroimaging studies show the various
regions that are activated).
49. Natalie Salmanowitz, The Case for Pain Neuroimaging in the Courtroom: Lessons from
Deception Detection, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 139, 143–44 (2015).
50. Id. at 145 (explaining how infliction of pain assists in pain neuroimaging studies); see
also Martin S. Angst et al., Determining Heat and Mechanical Pain Threshold in Inflamed Skin of
Human
Subjects,
J. VISUALIZED EXPERIMENTS
(Jan.
14,
2009),
at
1–2,
http://www.jove.com/pdf/1092/jove-protocol-1092-determining-heat-mechanical-pain-thresholdinflamed-skin-human (explaining the method of testing pain, which involved applying a heated
metal plate to participants’ skin and asking participants when they began to experience pain).
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peppers, or touched with a heated metal rod.51 They are asked to indicate
whether they feel pain.52 The MRI machine measures the hemoglobin ratios
before and a few seconds after the stimulus, and its results are then
analyzed through various complex statistical methods (notably those
involving machine learning algorithms) to find patterns of activation that
correlate with pain or its absence.53 Similar experiments are involved in
other mindreading fMRI approaches.54
Structural (as opposed to functional) MRI provides another possible
method of mindreading. In this case, the actual size, shape, and density of
various brain structures are measured.55 Those measurements in an
individual case could be correlated with the size and shape of those
structures in other people who are known to have had a particular condition,
such as Alzheimer disease or schizophrenia or pain.56 Again, to use pain as
an example, certain brain regions often are smaller than normal in people
who have lived with chronic pain compared with other, very similar people
who have not had chronic pain (the control group).57
51. See Christian Geber et al., Numbness in Clinical and Experimental Pain – A CrossSectional Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Reduced Tactile Function, 139 PAIN 73, 74 (2008)
(stating how in certain pain experiments, capsaicin was applied to the right or left forearm in
subjects); see also Angst et al., supra note 50.
52. See Angst et al., supra note 50, at 1 (stating that after applying the rod, study participants
are asked when they begin to feel pain).
53. See What Makes MRI Sensitive to Brain Activity?, NUFFIELD DEP’T CLINICAL
NEUROSCIENCES,
http://www.ndcn.ox.ac.uk/research/introduction-to-fmri/what-is-fmri/whatdoes-fmri-measure-cont;d=Rk1SSUI= (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (detailing the process of blood
oxygenation level dependent (“BOLD”) MRI which depends on hemoglobin ratios to detect small
changes in brain activity to determine reactions to stimuli); see also Richard H. Gracely et al.,
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Evidence of Augmented Pain Processing in
Fibromyalgia, 46 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1333, 1334 (2002) (noting that different types of
brain scans now have a well-established history of being a useful tool for detecting if the
individual is feeling pain).
54. See Gracely et al., supra note 53, at 1340 (showing fMRI results from a study of patients
with fibromyalgia to determine how they processed pain differently from those without the
disease).
55. See Carolyn Asbury, Brain Imaging Technologies and Their Applications in
Neuroscience,
DANA
FOUND.
(Nov.
2011),
at
10,
12,
https://www.dana.org/uploadedFiles/Pdfs/brainimagingtechnologies.pdf (describing the difference
between a traditional MRI, which creates an image of the brain, and a fMRI, which “shows the
brain in action”).
56. See Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia, 49
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 6 (2001) (reviewing over a decade of research that used MRI technology
to study the physical differences in brain structures between patients with and without
schizophrenia).
57. A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and
Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 17 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10410, 10413 (2004) (discussing an early
study that found that chronic pain sufferers had decreased gray matter compared to control
subjects without chronic pain).
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Various other methods, including electroencephalograms, CT
(computerized tomography) scans, diffusion tensor imaging, and
electrocorticography could also be used.58 In every case, they would
measure some objective physical (including electrical) state relevant to
brain activity that would then be correlated with similar physical states in
other people (or perhaps in the same person at other times) known, almost
entirely by self-report, to be correlated with certain subjective mental
states.59
This is not fundamentally different from how we and the law go about
assessing someone else’s pain. We look at objective, physical evidence—
the sounds people make (whether words, groans, or screams), their
behavior, and the past or present physical condition of parts of their bodies
other than their brains (including sometimes imaging of those body parts)—
that we believe are correlated with given mental states. Sometimes we get
expert testimony about those correlations; other times we just use our own,
often flawed, experience.
Neuroimaging evidence of mental states will usually, if not always, be
like current evidence in another, important way: it will be used as one of
several different lines of evidence. One of the areas where the discussion of
neuroimaging-based mindreading often takes a wrong turn (which I have
been guilty of myself) is by assuming the neuroimaging result is the
definitive signal—something that, all by itself, conclusively demonstrates
the existence or absence of the mental state in question.
That might, perhaps, occasionally be true, but it is much more likely
that the neuroimaging will be one additional piece of independent evidence.

58. See Asbury, supra note 55, at 13–16 (defining the technical process of other
neuroimaging techniques, such as electroencephalograms and diffusion tensor imaging, and their
common uses in comparison to different types of MRIs); see also M. Demitri, Types of Brain
Imaging Techniques, PSYCH CENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/lib/types-of-brain-imagingtechniques/0001057 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (describing how CT scans work to show the
“gross features” of the brain).
59. See John-Dylan Haynes & Gearing Rees, Decoding Mental States From Brain Activity in
Humans, 7 NATURE REVS. 523, 530 (2006) (cautioning that while neuroimaging is advancing to
the point that brain activity could be mapped and, in some cases, attributed to certain mental
states, it is currently difficult to generalize that information because such comparisons between
people are not yet reliable). The polygraph is an interesting example of how a scientific test could
be used to demonstrate a mental state in court. It measures a variety of physical states, including
pulse rate, breathing rate, blood pressure, and galvanic skin response (sweaty palms), all of which
are correlated with the emotion of nervousness. See Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 386
(detailing the physical conditions that a polygraph machine can measure). Polygraphs are not
generally admissible in court because those correlations are not considered strong enough. But
they are in admitted in court in some instances, and are used more broadly in administrative
proceedings or other law-related contexts. Id.; see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003) (discussing the scientific evidence of the polygraph).
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Brains are complicated and individual.60 It is unlikely that everyone’s brain
will react the same way to exactly the same stimulus, particularly with a
complex stimulus or behavior.61 It is more likely that, at best, an expert
testifying about the implications of an fMRI scan with respect to the
subject’s subjective feeling of pain will be able to say something like “when
we see this pattern of brain activation, in similar circumstances, 90 percent
of people we believe to be honest report that they’re in pain. When we take
people who report, we think honestly, that they are not in pain, we only see
this pattern five percent of the time.”
That evidence would then be considered along with plaintiffs’ or
claimants’ self-reports, other reports of their behavior, evidence about the
presence or absence of some physical condition correlated with the
existence of pain, and so on. Neuroimaging may well be strong evidence,
but it is very unlikely to be perfect.62 If we saw a person whose leg had just
been broken, screaming in apparent agony and avoiding any pressure on
that leg, we would likely (and rightly) dismiss a simultaneous fMRI study
(assuming that were possible) that showed a very low likelihood of pain. In
neuroimaging, as in our day-to-day world, we may read minds, but not
perfectly. It will, at least some times, be one added piece of evidence that
the triers of fact should consider in reaching a decision.
Forensic DNA, the great breakthrough in scientific evidence in the last
several decades, provides a somewhat unfortunate parallel for forensic
mindreading. Forensic DNA, the use of a person’s DNA variations to
identify him as the same or different person from the person who left a
DNA sample, is much closer to perfect than mindreading is or is likely ever
to be.63 The chances of a match between any two random people are,
60. See Douglas B. McKeag & Jeffrey S. Kutcher, Concussion Consensus: Raising the Bar
and Filling in the Gaps, 19 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 343, 344–45 (2009) (noting that the
variability of each brain poses a challenge to clinical decision making).
61. Id. at 343–45 (noting that even if you had 100 similar athletes sustain identical traumas to
the head, the outcomes for each would be different because of individual variations in the brain).
62. See Adam Teitcher, Note, Weaving Functional Brain Imaging Into the Tapestry of
Evidence: A Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355, 393–94 (2011) (noting that if neuroimaging were to be used, in this case, as evidence in
a criminal trial, it would not be used in isolation to draw definitive conclusions, but it would still
be considered in the context of other types of evidence).
63. See
DNA
Fingerprinting,
GENEED,
http://geneed.nlm.nih.gov/topic_subtopic.php?tid=37&sid=38 (last visited Mar. 29, 2015)
(explaining how DNA fingerprinting—that is, DNA used in a forensic or criminal case context—
is when DNA evidence is taken from a crime scene and compared to a sample from a suspect); see
also How Accurate is Forensic Analysis?, WASH. POST (April 16, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/forensic-analysis-methods/ (observing that
DNA is the only method of forensic analysis that is consistent and accurate, though if lab
technicians do not handle the DNA evidence properly, the accuracy could be compromised).
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although not (quite) zero, infinitesimal.64 Forensic laboratories could
always make those odds even lower by examining more than the tiny
fraction of DNA currently pressed into normal forensic use.65
But even forensic DNA is not, and cannot be, perfect.66 Some people
have twins, and forensic DNA, at least as it is usually employed today,
cannot distinguish between identical twins, though it can easily distinguish
non-identical ones.67 Some DNA samples will be degraded or so
intermingled as to lead to possible errors.68 Some samples will be
mislabeled or misread through accident or through fraud.69
The rest of genetics, that is, genetics that looks for associations
between genetic variations and diseases or traits (and not identification of
genetic variations and diseases or traits), provides a useful parallel. Some
doctors and scientists used to think that genes were destiny—that a
particular genetic variant led inevitably to a particular result.70 The more we
have learned about genetics, the less true that view has become.71 In
64. See William C. Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value
of DNA Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1 (2003) (citing to a an example of a jury being told that
a random match, though unlikely, could occur).
65. See William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (an Extract
from the Full Paper), GENEWATCH, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 5, 8 (noting that as the number of alleles
in a DNA profile decrease, meaning that a smaller sample is compared, the probability that a
random person would be a match for that sample increases, which suggests that the converse is
also true).
66. See id. at 5–6 (describing how DNA matches are generally very reliable, but it cannot be
guaranteed to be accurate in every situation).
67. Traditional forensic DNA could not distinguish between identical twins, but next
generation sequencing technology will likely resolve this problem. See Jacqueline WeberLehmann et. al., Finding the Needle in the Haystack: Differentiating “Identical” Twins in
Paternity Testing and Forensics by Ultra-Deep Next Generation Sequencing, 9 FORENSIC SCI.
INT'L: GENETICS 42, 45 (2014) (describing new testing methods that would be able to distinguish
identical twins because of very small genetic variations found in body fluid samples); see also
Nadia Drake, A Test That Distinguishes Identical Twins May Be Used in Court for First Time,
WIRED (Dec. 4, 2014) http://www.wired.com/2014/12/genetic-test-distinguishes-identical-twinsmay-used-court-first-time/ (describing how this new technique could be used in the legal arena
this year to solve a rape case where DNA evidence taken from semen will indicate that one man
committed the crime—not his twin brother).
68. See Thompson, supra note 65, at 6 (describing how degradation or contamination can
interfere with accurate matching in DNA samples).
69. Id. And, of course, even a correct DNA identification only says the sample came from the
suspect or defendant, not that he was guilty of the crime. The DNA may have gotten to the crime
scene innocently. See id. (discussing potential errors in the laboratory setting and the possibility
that someone could intentionally manipulate the biological evidence).
70. See I. de Melo-Martín, Firing up the Nature/Nurture Controversy: Bioethics and Genetic
Determinism, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 526, 526 (2005) (stating that discussions of genetic determinism
have been around for a long time).
71. See Margaret Lock, Eclipse of the Gene and the Return of Divination, 46 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPP.) S46, S50 (2005) (explaining that genes determine very little).
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defense of those who supported this theory, the first associations between
particular genetic variations and diseases were always very strong. The
strongest associations were the easiest to find and hence the first to be
found, leading to ascertainment bias. It was not irrational to think that other,
still undiscovered single genetic variations would also be fully responsible
for diseases. Instead, for most diseases (including some, like cystic fibrosis,
which used to be thought as “fully penetrant,” affecting everyone with the
relevant genetic variation), we now know that variations in DNA are almost
always just one influence, increasing or decreasing the person’s risk from
that of the average person, along with the effects of environment and
chance.72 Genetic variations are thumbs on the probability scale, moving
people from, for example, a 15 percent lifetime risk of a disease up to a 25
percent risk, or down to a five percent risk.
There are still some variations in the genome that are all powerful. As
far as we know, the only way a person with the genetic variations that cause
Huntington’s disease will not die from that disease is to die first from
something else.73 There may be a few cases where neuroimaging evidence
will be similarly powerful. It seems likely, for example, that an adult74
whose visual cortex is shown (by neuroimaging) to have been completely
destroyed by a tumor, a stroke, or an accident will be totally blind.75
Without a visual cortex, even someone with perfectly functioning eyes and
nerves will not be able see.76

72. See Steven P. Spielberg, Editor-in-Chief’s Commentary: Gene Penetrance, Therapeutic
Targets, and Regulatory Science, 47 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 289, 289 (2013)
(explaining that cystic fibrosis is now understood to be caused by a variety of mutations); see also
Lock, supra note 71, at S50 (characterizing genes as one actor in a complex scenario).
73. See Marianne J U Novak & Sarah J Tabrizi, Huntington’s Disease, 341 BRIT. MED. J. 34,
37 (2010) (labeling Huntington’s as a slowly progressing incurable disease).
74. Brains are complicated, and sometimes damage to seemingly essential areas can be
compensated for if it happens early in life. For example, some children who are missing half of
their cerebrums—the biggest and most “human” part of the brain—can grow up to be normal or
very close to it. See Charles Choi, Strange but True: When Half a Brain Is Better than a Whole
One, SCI. AM. (May 24, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-but-true-whenhalf-brain-better-than-whole (explaining the operation of hemispherectomy and how children
receiving the operation develop with normal memory and personality).
75. See Marco Tamietto et al., Unseen Facial and Bodily Expressions Trigger Fast Emotional
Reactions, 42 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17661, 17661 (2009) (referring to the phenomenal
blindness that results from unilateral destruction of the visual cortex). But see Petra Stoerig,
Blindsight, Conscious Vision, and the Role of the Visual Cortex, 155 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 217,
230 (2006) (noting that the brain’s plastic capacities allow functional improvements following the
destruction of the primary visual cortex).
76. See How Vision Works, BRAIN HQ, http://www.brainhq.com/brain-resources/brain-factsmyths/how-vision-works (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (explaining how the visual cortex is necessary
for the perception of size, depth, edges, color, and form).
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For mindreading, understanding a specific individual’s subjective
mental states means that it seems likely that most, if not all, of the
neuroimaging evidence will be suggestive (or non-informative), but not
conclusive. But it will still provide some evidence. How good that evidence
will be and how we will want to use it are the questions to which we now
turn.
II.

HOW MIGHT THE LAW USE NEUROSCIENCE-BASED MINDREADING
EVIDENCE?

Assuming the evidence were sufficiently accurate, an issue discussed
in Part III, the possibilities for using neuroscience-based mindreading
evidence in the law are limited only by the relevance of mental states to the
law, which is to say, almost unlimited. This section will briefly set out three
potential uses: communication, lie detection understood broadly, and lie
detection understood narrowly.
A.

Communication

Neuroimaging-based mindreading might allow communication with
people with whom one cannot otherwise communicate. An amazing
example of this comes from recent research in people who have “disorders
of consciousness.”77
These people have consciousness that is limited in one way or
another.78 Some are in comas, which is a relatively transitory state akin to
77. See generally Joseph T. Fins, Rethinking Disorders of Consciousness: New Research and
Its Implications, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22, 22 (2005) (explaining how new understandings
of brain injury are shaping how the potential for recovery is approached); Disorders of
Consciousness, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/cg/disorders-of-consciousness.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015) (explaining disorders of consciousness as conditions where the state of
awareness or wakefulness is disturbed); see also Matthew H. Davis et al., Dissociating Speech
Perception and Comprehension at Reduced Levels of Awareness, 41 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 16032 (2007) (finding high levels of resilience for speech during sedation); J. Andrew
Billings et al., Severe Brain Injury and the Subjective Life, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 17
(2010) (referring to the novel idea that communication with patients may be possible following a
severe brain injury); D.J. Wilkinson et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Treatment from Vegetative Patients, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 508 (2009) (outlining the
ethical issues associated with removal of life support in the context of new brain-imaging
research).
78. See Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: Coma, Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious States, in STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: EXPERIMENTAL INSIGHTS INTO MEDITATION,
WAKING, SLEEP AND DREAMS 29, 30–31 (Dean Cvetkovic & Irena Cosic eds., 2011) (explaining
that when the interaction of the cerebral cortex, brainstem, and thalamus is disrupted,
consciousness becomes impaired).
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deep sleep.79 People in comas do not respond to stimuli; they tend either to
die or improve within a few weeks.80 Other people are in what is called a
“vegetative state.”81 These people are also unresponsive to stimuli, but they
do not always seem to be asleep.82 They go through sleeping/waking
cycles, and during the waking portions, their eyes will open, their bodies
will move, and sounds will issue from their mouths; none of those actions is
any apparent response to any stimuli.83 Another group is classed as those in
a “minimally conscious state.”84 These people usually appear to be
vegetative, but occasionally—a few times a day, once every few weeks—
have short periods of responsiveness.85 People in a vegetative or minimally
conscious state may be in those states permanently, may improve, or may
decline.86
Two researchers, Adrian Owen, originally of Cambridge University
and now at the University of West Ontario, and Steven Laureys at the
University of Liège, have been exploring these states for over a decade.87 A
few years ago, they used 54 consecutive people who came into their
hospitals in either a vegetative state or a minimally conscious state as
research subjects.88 They put these people in MRI scanners and talked to
them.89 They told each of these people two different things: either to think
about playing tennis (“motor imagery”), or to think about walking through
their homes or around their neighborhoods (“spatial imagery”).90

79. See id. at 32 (“Coma is a state of non-responsiveness in which the patients lie with closed
eyes cannot be awakened even when intensively stimulated.”).
80. See id. at 32–33 (explaining that people in comas have neither verbal production nor
response to command, but can present reflexive responses to pain, and that prolonged comas
progress to brain death, a vegetative state, or sometimes a locked-in syndrome).
81. Id. at 33; see infra note 82 (describing the awareness level of a vegetative patient).
82. See Gosseries et al., supra note 78, at 33 (explaining that the vegetative patient is awake
but not aware).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 34; see also infra note 85 (describing the capacity for communication of the
minimally conscious patient).
85. See Gosseries et al., supra note 78, at 34 (stating that patients in a vegetative state cannot
functionally communicate, but can sometimes respond to verbal commands and make
understandable verbalizations).
86. Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity Disorders of Consciousness,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010).
87. Id. at 579; see generally Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State,
and Related Disorders, 3 LANCET NEUROLOGY 537 (2004) (demonstrating the author’s affiliation
and credentials).
88. Monti et al., supra note 86.
89. See id. at 581 (describing what the researchers discussed with the patients).
90. Id.
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While these conversations were going on with totally unresponsive
subjects, the MRI was doing an fMRI scan, detecting relative ratios of
oxygenated and de-oxygenated hemoglobin to determine what areas of the
brain were active when the subjects were told these scenarios.91
Specifically, for the tennis question, the researchers looked for activation in
the secondary motor area, which is usually activated when people are
thinking about making motions.92 For the walking around question, the
researchers were looking for activation in the parahippocampal gyrus, an
area that is often activated when people are navigating.93 For 49 of the 54
people, the researchers found no signal in either location.94 For five people,
the researchers got activation in the secondary motor area when they were
talking about tennis; for four of those five people, and no one else, when
they were asked the navigation question, the researchers saw activation in
the parahippocampal gyrus.95
These people had not been responding outwardly, by any sign, to
anything, but their brains responded to being talked to. That, in itself, does
not mean they were conscious, as a sleeping person’s brain might
distinguish between hearing a siren in the distance and hearing a baby cry.
Owen and Laureys took the experiment a step further.96 One of their
subjects had been diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state for over five
years.97 He was one of the four people whose brain responded to both
questions, so they put him back in the MRI scanner and asked him yes and
no questions, such as “Was your father’s name Alexander?” and “Do you
have any brothers?”98 The patient, although completely outwardly
unresponsive, “was instructed to respond by thinking of one type of
imagery (either motor imagery or spatial imagery) for an affirmative answer
and the other type of imagery for a negative answer.”99 He was asked six

91. Id. at 579; see generally Jeroen C.W. Siero et al., Blood Oxygenation LevelDependent/Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: Underpinnings, Practice, and Perspectives,
8 PET CLINICS. 579, 579 (2013) (providing a comprehensive overview of blood oxygenation
level-dependent brain activity).
92. See Monti, supra note 86, at 579, 581 (explaining that imagery tasks are associated with
MRI activity in certain portions of the brain, and disclosing why the researchers chose these types
of questions).
93. See id. at 584 (noting that activity in the parahippocampal gyrus during the activation
period was compared to the parahippocampal gyrus activity during the rest period).
94. Id. at 585, 588.
95. Id. at 583.
96. See id. at 585 (explaining that the researchers conducted additional tests on some
participants).
97. Id. at 581.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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questions, and based on the activation patterns in his fMRI scan, got the
first five right.100 For whatever reason—sleep, boredom, ambiguity,
confusion, something else—he made no discernible response to the last
question.101
Since that 2010 publication, this field has been very active and the
story has become complicated, but no one seems to doubt that at least some
people in vegetative states can use this method to respond correctly to some
questions—that is, mindreading for communication.102 You could imagine
using that method for answers to be used in court, in a hospital, or in a
nursing facility in order to ask people whether they are in pain, what
treatment they want, or anything else. The legal and non-legal implications
are profound.
B.

Lie Detection Broadly

The biggest use of neuroscience-based mindreading in law will be de
facto lie detection. This is not necessarily lie detection, where the mind is
probed to see if it has a deceptive purpose, but looking for evidence of
mental states that are at variance with the person’s description of his or her
mental state. Thus, when someone who answers the question “are you in
pain?” with “yes, I am,” testing for whether that person’s physical brain
state is or is not strongly correlated with the subjective mental state of pain
is, in effect, lie detection.
This form of lie-detection is neither new nor unusual. Police officers
could stop a driver whose car is weaving and ask, “Are you intoxicated?”
When the driver slurs “off courshe I’m nawt, orfisher,” the policeman could
take the driver’s word for it, or the policeman could test his blood alcohol
using a Breathalyzer. In that case, the Breathalyzer functions, at least in
part, as a lie detector.103 It provides evidence of a mental state in addition to
the person’s self-report.104 “Doping” tests in sports are another example. So

100. Id. at 584–85.
101. Id. at 585.
102. See, e.g., Dalia B. Taylor, Note, Communication with Vegetative State Patients: The Role
of Neuroimaging in American Disability Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (2014) (providing an
article showing that the field is expanding).
103. Looked at rigorously, a breathalyzer is both less and more than a lie detector. The drunk
driver might honestly believe he is sober, so detecting a high blood alcohol might provide
evidence of intoxication without necessarily showing that the driver lied. At the same time, the
breathalyzer’s blood alcohol percentage is correlated only imperfectly with the subjective mental
state: two people could have the same blood alcohol percentage with very different subjective
mental states.
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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are law school exams—a professor could just ask her students, “do you
understand the course really well? Well? Not so well? Terribly?” The
professor could give them grades based on their answers to that question. In
many areas, however, we are not comfortable relying on self-report and,
when we can, we want more evidence than just someone’s statement.
Neuroscience-based mindreading may be able provide additional
evidence to double check a person’s reported mental state wherever mental
state is important to the law. Neuroscience-based pain detection is one clear
example. It could be useful for people—infants or the unconscious—or
even, perhaps, non-people (non-human animals or maybe human fetuses)
who cannot communicate. But it is likely to be more useful in testing
whether somebody who claims to be in pain is showing the brain activation
patterns that do or do not correlate with the existence of either acute or
chronic pain.
Pain is not the only such legally important mental state. My Stanford
colleague Anthony Wagner studies the neuroscience of memory.105 He did
an experiment where he showed the research subjects (who were largely
undergraduate psychology majors, probably second only to rodents as
subjects of fMRI experiments) photographs of 476 faces, giving them a few
minutes to look at them, and telling them to try to remember the faces.106
He then put the subjects in an MRI and showed them 150 faces, half that
were among the faces they had seen before and half that were not.107 He
told them to push one of two buttons to signal whether they had or had not
seen the faces before.108 When he analyzed the fMRI results, he was able to
predict which button they were going to push; in other words, he was able
to determine whether they thought they recognized the face or not.109 He
was much less able to predict whether they had actually seen the face,
though he was still statistically significantly better than chance.110
Is that important? Well, think about a test where you show a defendant
in an MRI pictures of unpublicized pictures of a crime scene and then

105. See generally Kolber, supra note 15, at 439 (describing how neuroimaging may
supplement our evaluations of pain); Jesse Rissman et al., Detecting Individual Memories
Through the Neural Decoding of Memory States and Past Experience, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S.A. 9849, 9849–50 (2010) (describing a study in which participants were exposed to
grayscale photographs of faces).
106. Rissman et al., supra note 105, at 671–72.
107. Id. at 673 (describing the data acquisition process in which the functional imaging was
performed on a 3-T Signa MRI system and subjects were then exposed to the images).
108. Id. (noting that all participants responded using a keypad).
109. See generally id. at 678 (explaining the novelty detection and prediction error).
110. See id. at 678–79 (explaining how there was enhanced activation versus face stimuli
during the probe period).
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examine the results to determine whether his brain, right or wrongly,
recognized them or not. That should certainly not be used as conclusive
evidence of guilt or innocence, but it might be some evidence at trial and,
perhaps more importantly, before trial in making decisions about whom to
investigate.
A similar technique uses EEG, electro-encephalography, which has
many advantages over fMRI—it is cheap, portable, and easy to operate.111
This method looks for something called the P300 signal, which is a
response that occurs about 300 milliseconds after some stimuli.112
Researchers are not sure whether it comes after stimuli that subjects
remember or recognize, or if the response merely seems salient—if it occurs
only after they see something that draws their attention.113 This use of the
P300 signal has had, in some scientific circles, a bad name.114 The first
researcher to push this enthusiastically was Dr. Larry Farwell, who formed
a company called “Brain Fingerprinting” to use P300 for lie detection, and
then promoted it in ways that most people in the field thought were
exaggerated, putting the whole approach under a cloud.115 Another
researcher, Professor Peter Rosenfeld at Northwestern, has also worked
very hard on this approach along with many other researchers around the
world.116
Rosenfeld, again using undergraduate subjects, showed each subject
three photographs related to a terrorism scenario.117 He showed them an
iconic picture of a city (the Golden Gate Bridge for San Francisco, for
example), a location (a sports arena, an office building, or a school), and a

111. See Fabio Massimo Zanzotto & Danilo Croce, Comparing EEG/ERP-Like and fMRI-Like
Techniques for Reading Machine Thoughts, 6334 BRAIN INFORMATICS 133, 134 (2010)
(explaining how ERP/EEG is a relatively cheaper technique that provides more course-grained
data as opposed to fMRI models).
112. See Vahid Abootalebi et al., A comparison of Methods for ERP Assessment in a P300Based GKT, 62 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 309, 310 (2006) (explaining how the peak is
between 300–1000 ms from the stimulus onset).
113. Id. (noting that the efficacy of P300-based lie detectors is still controversial).
114. See generally J. Peter Rosenfeld, Brain Fingerprinting: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV.
MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 21 (2005) (explaining how even though there has been considerable
positive publicity, there has also been negative criticism, and that the P300 has not been
necessarily a successful lie detector).
115. Id.at 20.
116. See id. (acknowledging that Rosenfeld is one of many investigators who have used brain
waves and related technology in the detection of deception).
117. See John B. Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300Based Concealed Information Test, 48 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 149, 150 (2010) (explaining the
participants selected and the use of three different categories of information used in the study).
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potential weapon (a bomb, a propane tank, or an automatic rifle).118 Each
subject saw one photo from each category, recreating in a sense, the board
game Clue: a propane tank, in San Francisco, in a football stadium.119 He
then showed them all the pictures in random order while they were being
monitored by the EEG, and looked for their P300 reactions.120 He reported
that with over 90 percent accuracy, he could tell from their reactions which
photos that the particular subject had seen earlier.121 This is not “lie
detection” since the subjects had not lied or even said anything. But if the
subjects had been asked about a terrorist plot, this would be one way of
providing some evidence about the accuracy of what they answered.

C.

Lie Detection Narrowly

In addition to these indirect methods of de facto lie detection, there is
frank lie detection, where people claim to be looking for signals of
deception itself.122 This has received a great deal attention (including from
me), mainly because two companies started selling this lie detection service
in the United States in 2007.123 Only one company is still in the market (the
improbably named No Lie MRI), while its competitor (the more restrained
“Cephos”) has dropped this service.124
Over 30 peer-reviewed studies have now found statistically significant
correlations between patterns of brain activation and when somebody is

118. Id. (explaining the procedure in which subjects were presented with a location, date, and
method of a planned attack).
119. Id. (describing the random order of each category).
120. Id. at 151 (describing the data acquisition process and how the bootstrap method was
applied in order to evaluate P300 reactions).
121. Id. at 152 (positively identifying 12 out of 12 “hypothetical” terrorism suspects through
the use of P300 mindreading).
122. See generally Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 377 (summarizing twelve research studies
which measured brain signals to identify deception signals in the brain); Elena Rusconi &
Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as Lie
Detector, 7 FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013) (analyzing scientific and legal
challenges to the use of fMRI scans as lie detectors, and concluding that due to ethical,
operational, and social hurdles, current fMRI procedures are unlikely to constitute a viable lie
detector for criminal courts).
123. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 4 (noting that No Lie MRI and
Cephos Corporation were founded in 2006 to bring lie detection tests to the court room).
124. See id. (describing private companies who conduct fMRI lie detection); see also Greg
Miller, Neuroscience is Getting Its Day in Court, Whether It’s Ready or Not, WIRED (Dec. 16,
2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/12/brain-science-law/ (confirming that Cephos no
longer provides fMRI lie-detection services).
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lying.125 The biggest concern with these findings though (apart from the
fact that the studies did not all find the same patterns of activation) is their
lack of “ecological realism.”126 The experiments were usually done with
undergraduates, and were always done with people who knew they were in
an experiment and were following orders to “lie.”127 But how relevant are
their reactions to a situation where someone under arrest says “no, I didn’t
try to buy cocaine from that officer”? This kind of method to detect a brain
signal of deceptive intent might turn out to work at some point, but much
more work needs to be done before it can reliably be used.
Judicial tests exist to determine whether scientific evidence like this
can be admitted in court, but there are many places within the legal system
(in criminal investigation and in sentencing, for example) where those
constraints do not apply.128 And there are almost no constraints on selling
these kinds of mind-reading services outside the legal system.129
III.

HOW TO JUDGE NEUROSCIENCE-BASED MINDREADING

If our society wants to use neuroscience-based mindreading, it is easy
enough to do it poorly. The better question is, how can we do it well? What
kind of proof should we demand before we accept such procedures as
providing reliable and useful evidence either inside or outside the
courtroom? The answer boils down to two things: science and systems. We
need to be confident that the science can provide powerful results, and we
need to be confident in the systems we use to produce those results. This

125. See Uri Hasson & Christopher J. Honey, Future Trends in Neuroimaging: Neural
Processes as Expressed Within Real-life Contexts, 62 NEUROIMAGE 1272, 1273 (2012) (noting
the growth of fMRI papers since 1994); see also, e.g., G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of
Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830–36 (2003)
(finding that lies elicited more brain activation than telling the truth).
126. See infra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–
04 (detailing that one of the main criticisms of the research is that study participants are not being
observed in real-world circumstances, and that they lie about something unimportant or “under
command”).
127. Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–04 (noting another criticism of the research is that
they “used healthy young adults, almost all right handed, with little gender or ethnic diversity”);
see, e.g., Meixner & Rosenfeld, supra note 117, at 152 (participants were undergraduate students
at Northwestern University).
128. See generally Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1579–1620 (2003) (analyzing the two general standards, Frye and Daubert, for
determining the admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony).
129. See generally Amy E. White, The Lie of fMRI: An Examination of the Ethics of a Market
in Lie Detection Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 22 HEALTHCARE ETHICS
COMMITTEE FORUM 253, 259–61 (2010) (analogizing the use of fMRI to that of a polygraph test
in analyzing the ethical and legal considerations when using fMRI testing).

Greely Final.docx

194

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 18:171

section will explore both of those points, and will then suggest, as an
example, how we might seek to make neuroscience-based pain detection
reliable enough for widespread use.
A.

Science

Neuroscience-based mindreading depends on correlating subjective
mental states with physical brain states using fMRI, with activation patterns
inferred from ratios of oxygenated to de-oxygenated hemoglobin.130 We
will need good science to know just how strong those correlations are.
Science would benefit from five things that are generally missing today: big
samples, diverse samples, ecologically realistic experiments, studies of
countermeasures, and, of at least some value, underlying theories to help
explain (and test) the correlations.
Most fMRI experiments today are done with only a few subjects,
whether that be four, ten, twenty, or thirty. Although the published studies
claim statistical significance in spite of the low numbers, we would be more
confident if we had studies done on hundreds or thousands of people. The
problem is that fMRI studies are expensive—one hour-long scan of one
subject, when overhead and analysis costs are included, will often cost a
researcher more than $1,000.131 Genetics projects can get multi-million
dollar grants; fMRI research has to make do with much smaller budgets and
hence, much smaller numbers.132
But just having more subjects is not enough. Testing 10,000 white,
right-handed undergraduate males at elite schools, all of whom denied ever
taking illegal drugs, would not necessarily tell us about people who did not
meet those criteria. For confidence, good-sized studies need to be done on
young people and old people, men and women, people who have taken
drugs and those who haven’t, people who are currently taking drugs and
people who aren’t, people who have had mental illnesses of various sorts

130. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 2.
131. See Yale School of Medicine, Usage Charges, MAGNETIC RESONANCE RES. CENTER,
http://mrrc.yale.edu/users/charges.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) (quoting a $720 cost per fMRI
slot plus a $250 per study for analysis support).
132. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Estimates of Funding for Various
Research, Condition, and Disease Categories (RCDC), NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING
TOOLS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx (providing a list of every
grant awarded by the NIH in the past three years, detailing that research dollars granted to all
“Neurosciences”—including fMRI research—totaled about $5.7 billion compared with $7.5
billion granted to “Genetics” research).
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and people who haven’t.133 Fundamentally, one would like to have good
studies of a wide variety of people who are, in most (if not all) plausibly
relevant ways, like the real life subject who would be questioned using
mindreading.
At the same time, the experiments need to be realistic. In some cases,
that may not be hard. For people who claim to have incapacitating back
pain while lying down, having them lie down in scanners will be fairly
similar to their real world experience—that is, assuming they are not so
distracted or frightened by the scanner as to produce different results. Other
cases may be more difficult, sometimes for physical or temporal reasons.
People whose back pain comes when sitting may not be easily testable in
the horizontal tubes of most MRI machines. People who claim occasionally
to experience crippling headaches just may not have a headache when
scanned.
Sometimes, though, the problems will not be physical or logistical, but
ethical. Lie detection experiments today are done on people who know they
are in a research experiment, who have signed a consent form after being
told about the experiment, who are following orders to lie, and who face no
severe consequences if their lie is not believed.134 A much better test would
be to have the police arrest some random undergraduates for, say, underage
drinking offenses and scan them all when they are questioned about their
drinking. A blood test or a Breathalyzer should be able to provide a “gold
standard” for whether they had been drinking; those questioned could be
divided into a two-by-two matrix of those who had been drinking and those
who hadn’t, and those who had told the truth and those who didn’t.
The only problem is that no institutional review board (“IRB”) will (or
should) allow you to treat research subjects that way. Yet, without the spur
of real anxiety leading to “real” lying, it may not be possible to know
whether the mindreading techniques from controlled experiments would
produce the same result with real criminals, or even with the dutiful son
who, less than truthfully, says on Thanksgiving, “no, Mom, the turkey was
perfect and it wasn’t too dry.” The results in a typical experiment might
transfer to the real world, but they might not. Without some more realistic
experiments, how can we be confident about their relevance?
Countermeasures raise another important issue. Consider
neuroimaging for pain detection. Many people who have had kidney stones
133. See generally Katherine S. Button et al., Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size
Undermines the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 365, 365–66
(2013) (analyzing how the incentive to publish causes scientists to limit the sample size, thus
reducing the reliability of their studies).
134. See Greely & Illes, supra note 19, at 403–04.
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will be happy to tell you how painful they were. If a plaintiff is in an MRI
machine trying to pretend that he is feeling pain, what will the scanner
show if he concentrates on remembering every excruciating detail of his
kidney stone? We don’t know. We know that countermeasure can be
successfully employed (by at least some people) against the polygraph, but
most mindreading researchers (with a few honorable exceptions) have not
begun to think about seeing if countermeasures work, or if there are
countermeasures to the countermeasures.135
For all of these points, it would help if neuroscience had provided
strong predictive theories about what kinds of brain activation patterns one
should expect for certain subjective mental states. A set of testable
hypotheses, if consistently upheld in experiments, could give us more
confidence that the correlations we are seeing are real. Right now, most of
this work is purely empirical—subjects in scanners are exposed to stimuli
that are expected to create a subjective mental state (pain, recognition,
deception), and the researchers trawl through the universe of the fMRI data
looking to see what seems to be associated with the stimulus.136 Compare
that to forensic DNA, where we have excellent reasons (both theoretical and
empirical) to believe that, apart from monozygotic (identical) twins, two
people are extremely unlikely to have matching DNA profiles.137
More studies, with more diverse populations, with greater realism and
attention to possible countermeasures, as well as some testable predictive
theories about what kinds of activation patterns should be expected, would
produce much greater confidence in the results of neuroscience-based
mindreading. But science alone is not enough.
B.

Systems

The second thing that is crucial to confidence in a scientific
technology is a system. The tests should follow defined protocols, and
should use accredited laboratories where the technicians follow the
instructions in a manual to perform the test the same way every time.
135. See generally Giorgio Ganis et al,, Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures
Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312
(2011) (examining the effects of countermeasures on the reliability of fMRI results).
136. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 122, at 2–3 (noting how the research
aggregates data taken from brain scanners).
137. See generally Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can
Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991) (analyzing
how the rigor of DNA testing provides a model for the introduction of new forms of forensic
evidence); see also Rana Saad, Discovery, Development, and Current Applications of DNA
Identity Testing, 18 BUMC PROC. 130 (2005) (describing the reliability of DNA testing).
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Only one U.S. appellate decision has ruled on neuroscience-based lie
detection: United States v. Semrau.138 The district court magistrate judge
(now an Article III district judge) wrote an excellent opinion, which the
Sixth Circuit affirmed and largely adopted.139 The Sixth Circuit took
concern with the fact that the fMRI lie detection service (which the criminal
defendant had used) made up their procedures as they went along.140 The
experiments on which they based their method had, unusually, been done
on people aged 18 to 50, but the defendant was 63 years old.141 They tested
the defendant twice on the same day.142 In the morning session, the result
said he was telling the truth, but the afternoon session showed he was
lying.143 The firm then decided that he had probably been tired in the
afternoon, so they repeated the test on a later day, getting another favorable
result, which led the expert to testify that “a finding such as this is 100%
accurate in determining truthfulness from a truthful person.”144
Given that this particular person had “passed” the test only two times
out of three, that “100%” seemed questionable, and that kind of ad hoc
cherry picking of results does not promote confidence.145 As the district
court said:
Because the use of fMRI-based lie detection is still in its
early stages of development, standards controlling the reallife application have not yet been established. Without such
standards, a court cannot adequately evaluate the reliability
of a particular lie detection examination. Assuming,
arguendo, that the standards testified to by Dr. Laken could

138. 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
139. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 6845092, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2010), aff'd, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
140. 693 F.3d at 522 (noting that there are no concrete standards from real world testing, and
that the tests that were performed on Dr. Semrau in the laboratory were different from those used
in other studies, suggesting that the firm was still trying to understand the basics of fMRI lie
detection results).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 518–19.
143. Id. at 519.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 519–20 (explaining that some doubt the results because there is a difference in what
a person believes and conveys during the test, and what the person was thinking during the actual
event).
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satisfy Daubert, it appears that Dr. Laken violated his own
protocols when he re-scanned Dr. Semrau. . . .146
An excellent precedent exists for providing (and following) standards
for forensic tests: forensic use of DNA.147 The forensic use of DNA is not
perfect—mistakes can be made, or test results can be corrupted
intentionally.148 But, overall, it has been remarkably successful.149
In the early 1990s, though, when prosecutors first tried to introduce
DNA evidence in U.S. courts, it was very controversial.150 One problem
was with the science.151 Experts disagreed about the likely effects of
patterns of genetic variations within populations that might throw off the
results.152 Some argued that results based on the frequencies of different
markers in, say, European-Americans might not apply to AfricanAmericans or Native Americans.153 These arguments resulted in a report by
the National Academy of Sciences that concluded the concern was
appropriate.154 The report argued that further research needed to be done,
but until it was, the courts should only allow the use of very conservative
estimates of the odds against an accidental match.155 Several years later,
after that further research had been, the National Academy did a second
146. United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 6845092, at *13 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010), aff'd, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d
1053, 1061 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999)).
147. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 250 (2006) (noting that there is a uniform standard of
DNA markers).
148. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 130 (1992) [hereinafter Strengthening Forensic Science] (noting that
there is a possibility of false positives or fraudulent dealings with the results).
149. Id. at 184 (referring to the success that the judiciary system has had in the use of forensic
DNA).
150. See id. at 40 (noting that there were concerns that there needed to be more blind trials
prior to its use).
151. See id. at 40–41 (stating that the use of DNA evidence in the courts for forensic purposes
was concerning due to the possibility of contamination and degradation of the evidence along with
statistical analysis faultiness).
152. See Greely et al., supra note 147, at 251 (noting that certain genetic structures may cause
random matches to be a greater possibility); see also NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC EVIDENCE 79–80 (1992) [hereinafter DNA Technology] (noting that
population substructures could have an impact on genotype frequency calculations).
153. See DNA Technology, supra note 152, at 79 (stating that different allele frequencies are
apparent in their respective racial groups).
154. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 187 (1996)
[hereinafter Evaluation of DNA Evidence] (noting that the 1992 National Academy of Sciences
report shows that there were differing views of population geneticists on this topic, which was
"proof of a major scientific disagreement.").
155. Id. at 187 n.69, 204.

2015]

NEUROSCIENCE, MINDREADING, AND THE COURTS

199

report and concluded the problem had been solved.156 That is an example of
the raising and answering of scientific questions about the technique.
At least as important for the use of forensic DNA was the
standardization of testing protocols. In an early criminal case that involved
the use of forensic DNA in the New York state courts, People v. Castro,
after the day’s testimony, some of the expert witnesses for the opposing
sides got together and talked about the case. (I have heard one participant
say that their discussions took place at a bar after the day’s testimony.) Two
of the prosecution experts agreed with the defense experts that the
testimony should not be admitted because of the ways it did not live up to
the standards under which such testing should be done.157 Eventually, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) started accrediting crime labs to do
DNA work.158 The FBI produces and regularly updates a manual that not
only describes how the testing should be done, but states how and how
often the laboratory should be audited.159 Additional guidelines have been
created by the National DNA Index System (CODIS) in its Standards for
the Acceptance of DNA Data, and by the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board.160 The FBI and
CODIS guidelines apply to forensic DNA analyses that the federal
government conducts; the CODIS guidelines apply to testing done by the
156. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 6 (1996) (“The state of the profiling technology and the methods for
estimating frequencies and related statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility
of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted)).
157. See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons from the DNA War, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 43 (1993); see also People
v. Castro 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting that this constituted a landmark
case for the admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal cases).
158. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 2 (2012).
159. QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING LABORATORIES (2009),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/qas_testlab.pdf; see also
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), SWGDAM,
http://www.swgdam.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that the Scientific Working Group on
DNA Analysis Methods (“SWGDAM”) works with the FBI to create guidelines and standards for
DNA testing, analysis, and forensic work).
160. See Mark Nelson, Making Sense of DNA Backlogs—Myths vs. Reality, 266 NAT’L INST.
JUST. J. 20, 23 (2010) (noting that CODIS was created as a DNA database, which is accessible to
various federal and state agencies in their efforts to solve crime); see also FBI LAB., NAT'L DNA
INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL 5–6 (2013) (explaining the
standards of acceptance of DNA data); see also Objectives, AM. SOC'Y CRIME LABORATORY
DIRECTORS, http://www.ascld-lab.org/objectives/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that one of
the objectives of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation
Board is to establish testing standards and guidelines to improve forensic analysis).
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states, but that is sent to the national CODIS registry.161 For forensic DNA
analysis that is only for state use, the states set their own standards, which
usually adopt the FBI standards, the Accreditation Board’s standards, or
both.162 These required procedures are, of course, to some extent
bureaucratic and mindless, and they cannot prevent the occasional bad
mistake or corrupt worker. They do, however, make the process more
reliable and give judges and jurors (and the prosecution and defense
counsel) more confidence in its result.
C.

What Might Be Done and How: Pain Detection as an Example

Neuroscience-based pain detection could be tested to see how reliable
it is by first starting with experiments that have lots of subjects with diverse
characteristics, and by making the experimental conditions as similar as
possible to the conditions experienced by people with legal claims
stemming from pain. If some of the methods seem effective, test them for
countermeasures and, if countermeasures seem effective, look for ways to
detect or block them. And, while all of that testing is going on, researchers
can do supportive research (and thinking) on testable theories for how the
subjective feeling of pain should look in fMRI scans and why.
This is a process that is far beyond the possibilities of one researcher
with an NIH grant. Ultimately, it could require tens of thousands of subjects
and hundreds of millions of dollars. But one could ease into it. A researcher
could start with one or more of the most common kinds of pain that arise in
legal proceedings, at least as long as it seemed tractable to neurosciencebased detection. For example, a researcher could start by studying chronic
and allegedly disabling lower back pain among people over, say, 50. It is a
very common condition with an affected population that, although large,
might be fairly carefully defined.163
161. See Nelson, supra note 160 (noting that both the federal and state level enforcement
authorities have access to CODIS for DNA analysis information).
162. See History of DNA Databases, GOVERNOR’S OFF. CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/database.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that every
state in the nation has a statutory provision for the establishment of a DNA database); see, e.g., 44
PA. CONS. STAT. § 23 (2004) (providing for DNA detection of sexual and other offenders); see
also Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index
System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (noting that the CODIS and NDIS system are used both by both federal
and state agencies in DNA analysis work).
163. See Low Back Pain in Older Adults, SPINE-HEALTH, http://www.spinehealth.com/conditions/lower-back-pain/low-back-pain-older-adults (last visited Mar. 5, 2015)
(explaining that individuals over the age of 60 frequently suffer from back pain). Note that there
will still be a problem of having a “gold standard” baseline determination of whether a subject
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Scans of one thousand subjects of different ages, sexes, ethnic
backgrounds, drug use, and mental illness histories might be able to provide
some solid statistical evidence (with confidence intervals) for how often the
test produces false positives (in effect, its specificity) or false negatives (its
sensitivity). From that, one could calculate its positive predictive value
(what percentage of the time a positive test result will mean that someone is
actually in pain), and its negative predictive value (what percentage of the
time a negative test result will mean that someone is actually not in pain).
These could be further refined depending on the strength or weakness of
more traditional evidence about pain in particular cases. For example, in
cases where the traditional measures strongly indicated that pain was
present, the accuracy might be 98 percent; for weaker traditional evidence,
the accuracy might fall to 80 percent. Then, for test methods where the
results were promising, one hundred or two hundred subjects could be used
to test potential countermeasures.
The experimental conditions that produced the best results could then
be “routinized” for use in commercial laboratories or clinics. Expert groups
could propose procedures, manuals, and accreditation procedures, and the
accuracy rates of this pain detection in the “real world” could be tested
using those approved methods.
At that point, if the results were favorable, we would have a pain
detection test for a very common source of pain-related litigation for which
we knew the accuracy, the confidence intervals, and the efficacy of
countermeasures when these tests are performed according to standardized
procedures. That does not mean the method would be adopted universally,
if adopted at all. One issue lingers though: how good is good enough? Is a
98 percent positive predictive value (where only two percent of the subjects
with positive tests actually do not feel pain) good enough? What about a 90
percent negative predictive value (where ten percent of those who test
negative actually have pain)? Is the standard considered to be “good
enough” for research purposes still “good enough” in a jury trial involving
an automobile accident or in a social security disability proceeding before
an administrative law judge? How would juries or judges be expected to
weigh the neuroscience evidence against other, more traditional evidence
about pain? But at the very least, we would have a test whose accuracy was
well understood, and a test that people have reasons based on good
evidence to accept or to reject.

“really” is or is not in pain. Clinicians may be able to identify clear cases in one direction or
another, though that might still leave an intermediate group for whom the experimental results
would not be as clear.
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This would not be cheap though. My back-of-the-envelope estimate is
that $15 to $20 million over three years might be enough to get a good
handle on one or more tests for common chronic lower back pain. That is
probably about 0.05 percent or less of the NIH budget, but the NIH does not
include a “National Institute of Pain.”164 And this amount is a much higher
percentage of the budget of the National Institute of Justice, which spends
very little of its (very little) money on neuroscience research.165
But there should be ways to raise money for this kind of program of
test development. Legal disputes over pain are common and costly.166 We
know that, even with present expert testimony, sometimes the results are
wrong.167 People who should win, lose; and people who should lose, win.
Having a better test improves those results, which is a good thing, whether
it leads to more money being paid out (but with more accuracy) or less
money being paid out (also with more accuracy). There is another
advantage: having a better test should prevent more pain cases from going
to trial or going to hearings. The stronger the test, the more often lawyers or
parties will settle, thus saving valuable resources that otherwise could all
too easily be wasted in lengthy and expensive litigation.
The potential may be there, but who would do it? Insurers, state
disability programs, or the Social Security Administration might finance
such a research program; but if the research were only funded and
supervised by potential defendants, plaintiffs, claimants, and the lawyers
who represent them are likely to call foul. One would want to come up with
a source (or sources) of funding that is perceived as neutral, or at least a
source that is balanced in its biases toward each side. Finding such a source
is a challenge. Unless we take that challenge and move toward a rational,
well-funded program that seeks to create good neuroscience tests to detect
pain, progress will be slowed—not so much by the lack of science, but by
the lack of a plan and a program to get the science in a condition where it
can be useful in resolving disputes.

164. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235 (2015)
(detailing the NIH budget for 2015); David Malakoff & Jeffrey Mervis, First Look: New U.S.
Spending Deal a Mixed Bag for Science, SCIENCE INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2014, 10:30 PM),
http://news.sciencemag.org/funding/2014/12/first-look-new-u-s-spending-deal-mixed-bag-science
(explaining that the NIH is receiving roughly $30 billion for the fiscal year of 2015).
165. See Pub. L. No. 113-235 (describing the 2015 NIH budget).
166. Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of
Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1961) (explaining that many people have
experienced personal injury litigation, which is expensive).
167. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP.
U. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (1993) (noting that while courts have increasingly utilized expert witness
testimony, expert witnesses have not always been accurate in their testimony).
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THE DEEPEST IMPLICATION

Let us say that, hypothetically, neuroscience-based mindreading
works. Let us dream that someone neutral provides $20,000,000 over four
years, and that the investment yields a test that detects the presence or
absence of potentially disabling chronic lower back pain with positive and
negative predictive values of about 90 percent, plus or minus three percent.
If we are willing to accept 90 percent accuracy, especially when other
sources of evidence may also be considered, are there still potential
problems? Unfortunately, yes. Like all changes to the legal system, it will
bring new issues in its wake, but one seems particularly profound. It is
perhaps the deepest issue raised by mindreading.
Professor Nita Farahany has both written and is writing about an issue
that she calls “cognitive liberty”—others think about it under the term
“mental privacy”.168 Is scanning your brain different from a blood alcohol
test? Is it different from watching how you walk or from listening to what
you say? Is it invading something secret—or sacred?
I hate to use this example of my mother’s Thanksgiving turkey,
because my mother’s Thanksgiving turkey is never too dry. But if by some
odd chance one Thanksgiving, the turkey were too dry, and she were to ask
me, as she always does, “the turkey’s too dry this year, isn’t it,” then in the
highly counterfactual case that it actually was too dry, I would, without
hesitation or reservation, lie. If for some reason I could not lie, my ability at
least to keep silent or otherwise sidestep the question would be very
important.
In a more serious hypothetical, what if, for example, you are a citizen
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Assume the government
puts you in a scanner and shows you pictures of Kim Jong Un (president of
North Korea), then pictures of Park Geun-hye (president of South Korea),
and then pictures of President Obama. If the government wanted to be able
to “read” your brain’s emotional reactions to each photograph, you might
well want to be able keep your true feelings hidden.
Today we have that ability to hide, at least in practice. Although (at
least when the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination does

168. See generally Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012)
(noting that individuals called to testify struggle with balancing the legal compulsion to testify
with their own memories and personal thoughts, arguing that society should adopt more robust
protections to safeguard cognitive liberties); see also Wrye Sententia, Neuroethical
Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human
Cognition, 1013 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 221, 222–23 (defining cognitive liberty as
“freedom of thought”).
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not apply) the law can “force you” to testify, and “force you” to tell the
truth, it cannot really force you.169 It can jail you for contempt if you
refuse, and in some jurisdictions, it could torture you (or send you to allies
who will do the torture somewhere else).170 That may or may not get you to
tell the truth—or merely get you to say whatever the torturers want to hear.
Whatever the law, we have a special preserve that cannot reliably be
invaded. If it could be invaded, should we allow it to? Should we say
“never”? Or should we say, “it depends”?
If the mindreading is involuntary, it is tempting to say “no,” but then
one can construct “24 hour” terrorism scenarios that push the other
direction, perhaps toward allowing some involuntary mindreading but only
with a warrant.
There can also be “quasi-involuntary” circumstances. For example, say
someone wants to bring a lawsuit alleging damages from pain, but the
defendant seeks an order for a pain detection brain scan. The plaintiff may
have a fundamental objection to having her mind read, but refusing a courtordered medical test might lead to the dismissal of her suit. Is that
mindreading “voluntary”?
Of course, society could only allow the use of this kind of mindreading
on people who freely and genuinely volunteer. That seems fine—except if
you allow one person to do it voluntarily, what will that imply about those
who choose not to do it? Prosecutors might easily use this refusal against
people who refuse: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant could
have taken that lie detection test, but she chose not to. That is her right, but
it is your right to draw whatever conclusions you want from her refusal.”
Federal law does not allow such an argument to be made in criminal cases
where the defendant invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, but
would such a prohibition apply in these cases, especially in state civil cases
or administrative hearings? And would the decision maker draw the
negative inference without hearing it argued? Allowing anybody to use
neuroscience-based mindreading voluntarily puts pressure on everybody
else to do it, and thus makes their decisions less voluntary.
Assuming we end up able to see through these scanners less darkly and
more clearly, these are likely to be the deepest questions we will be forced
to answer. If neuroscience-based mindreading becomes one of more useful

169. See Being a Witness, OHIO ST. B. ASS’N (April 10, 2014), https://www.ohiobar.
org/ForPublic/Resources/LawFactsPamphlets/Pages/LawFactsPamphlet-20.aspx (explaining that
while an individual may be compelled by the courts to testify, the individual does not physically
have to testify).
170. See id. (explaining that if subpoenaed to be a witness in a trial, one must perform this duty
or face contempt of court, which can result in jail time).

2015]

NEUROSCIENCE, MINDREADING, AND THE COURTS

205

technologies, are there limits to when it should be used in order to protect
cognitive liberty? If we do think there should be such a right, where do we
find it—in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution? And maybe in the Second, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments of the Constitution? Is it in a constitutional penumbra?
Would we need new legislation, or would we need a new constitutional
amendment? I leave these questions for another day, but I am confident that
if neuroscience-based mindreading becomes feasible, as I suspect it will for
at least some applications, the day for those questions will come.
CONCLUSION
Not only do we live in interesting times, we also live in times that are
becoming more and more interesting, and much of the interest comes from
“secondary uses.” Neuroscientists are not (yet) receiving grants to create
pain detectors for court purposes, or lie detectors for the criminal justice
system.171 In the United States, neuroscientists are mainly funded by the
National Institutes of Health because we want to relieve human suffering by
learning more about how the brain works and how we can affect it.172 As
we learn more about the brain, we will make valuable inroads against
human suffering.
But, as we learn more about the brain, what we learn will not
necessarily be limited to understanding, preventing, or treating diseases.
Just as biological research could lead to biological warfare, more
knowledge about neuroscience and how human brains work can lead to
other applications of that knowledge for things like mindreading and other
practices that have plusses and minuses very different from those of the
health applications of the technologies.
We need, as a society, to pay enough attention, to become educated
enough, and to think and worry enough about these secondary uses. Then,
when they happen, we will have a decent chance to respond in an intelligent
and useful way. I used to say that I do the work I do to try to maximize the
benefits and minimize the harms of these new technologies. I have become
171. See generally Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United
States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349, 350 (Tade Matthias
Spranger ed., 2012) (noting the recent developments of neuroscience in the law and how various
organizations are looking into funding neuroscientists so that they may develop more information
on how neuroscience can benefit the law).
172. See NIH Data Sharing Repositories, TRANS-NIH BIOMED. INFORMATICS COORDINATING
COMMITTEE (BMIC), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/NIHbmic/nih_data_sharing_repositories.html (last
updated Mar. 10, 2015) (displaying NIH-supported data suppositories, including neuroscience
research funded by NIH grants).
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somewhat more humble. My hope now is that, if we can get enough people
educated and thinking about these issues in advance, we may be able to
avoid a few catastrophes.
So, I ask all of readers of this Article—please pay attention to the
possible beneficial and less beneficial uses of neuroscience-based
mindreading. If so, working together, we just might be able to avoid a few
catastrophes.

